Beyond Chance and Credence - read free eBook in online reader or directly download on the web page. Select files or add your book in reader. Download and read online ebook Beyond Chance and Credence write by Wayne C. Myrvold. This book was released on 2021-02-11. Beyond Chance and Credence available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Beyond Chance and Credence introduces a new way of thinking of probabilities in science that combines physical and epistemic considerations. Myrvold shows that conceiving of probabilities in this way solves puzzles associated with the use of probability and statistical mechanics.
Beyond Chance and Credence
Beyond Chance and Credence - read free eBook in online reader or directly download on the web page. Select files or add your book in reader. Download and read online ebook Beyond Chance and Credence write by Wayne C. Myrvold. This book was released on 2021-02-11. Beyond Chance and Credence available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Concepts related to probability permeate physics. This is most obvious in statistical mechanics, in which probabilities appear explicitly, but even in cases when predictions are made with near-certainty, there are implicit probabilistic assumptions in play. How are we to understand these probabilistic concepts? How do they apply to the physical world? Beyond Chance and Credence offers a fresh look at these familiar topics, urging readers to see them in a new light. The book provides an overview of the history of philosophical debates about the nature of probability over the last three centuries, and clear and accessible introductions to conceptual issues in probability theory, thermodynamics, and statistical mechanics. Myrvold argues that the traditional choice between probabilities as objective chances or else as degrees of belief is too limiting, and introduces a new concept, epistemic chances, that combines physical and epistemic considerations. He goes on to show that conceiving of probabilities in this way solves some of the puzzles associated with the use of probability and statistical mechanics. The result is an innovative perspective on one of the most central topics in the philosophy of science.
Beyond Chance and necessity
Beyond Chance and necessity - read free eBook in online reader or directly download on the web page. Select files or add your book in reader. Download and read online ebook Beyond Chance and necessity write by . This book was released on 1974. Beyond Chance and necessity available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle.
Quantum, Probability, Logic
Quantum, Probability, Logic - read free eBook in online reader or directly download on the web page. Select files or add your book in reader. Download and read online ebook Quantum, Probability, Logic write by Meir Hemmo. This book was released on 2020-04-07. Quantum, Probability, Logic available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. This volume provides a broad perspective on the state of the art in the philosophy and conceptual foundations of quantum mechanics. Its essays take their starting point in the work and influence of Itamar Pitowsky, who has greatly influenced our understanding of what is characteristically non-classical about quantum probabilities and quantum logic, and this serves as a vantage point from which they reflect on key ongoing debates in the field. Readers will find a definitive and multi-faceted description of the major open questions in the foundations of quantum mechanics today, including: Is quantum mechanics a new theory of (contextual) probability? Should the quantum state be interpreted objectively or subjectively? How should probability be understood in the Everett interpretation of quantum mechanics? What are the limits of the physical implementation of computation? The impact of this volume goes beyond the exposition of Pitowsky’s influence: it provides a unique collection of essays by leading thinkers containing profound reflections on the field. Chapter 1. Classical logic, classical probability, and quantum mechanics (Samson Abramsky) Chapter 2. Why Scientific Realists Should Reject the Second Dogma of Quantum Mechanic (Valia Allori) Chapter 3. Unscrambling Subjective and Epistemic Probabilities (Guido Bacciagaluppi) Chapter 4. Wigner’s Friend as a Rational Agent (Veronika Baumann, Časlav Brukner) Chapter 5. Pitowsky's Epistemic Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics and the PBR Theorem (Yemima Ben-Menahem) Chapter 6. On the Mathematical Constitution and Explanation of Physical Facts (Joseph Berkovitz) Chapter 7. Everettian probabilities, the Deutsch-Wallace theorem and the Principal Principle (Harvey R. Brown, Gal Ben Porath) Chapter 8. ‘Two Dogmas’ Redu (Jeffrey Bub) Chapter 9. Physical Computability Theses (B. Jack Copeland, Oron Shagrir) Chapter 10. Agents in Healey’s Pragmatist Quantum Theory: A Comparison with Pitowsky’s Approach to Quantum Mechanics (Mauro Dorato) Chapter 11. Quantum Mechanics As a Theory of Observables and States and, Thereby, As a Theory of Probability (John Earman, Laura Ruetsche) Chapter 12. The Measurement Problem and two Dogmas about Quantum Mechanic (Laura Felline) Chapter 13. There Is More Than One Way to Skin a Cat: Quantum Information Principles In a Finite World(Amit Hagar) Chapter 14. Is Quantum Mechanics a New Theory of Probability? (Richard Healey) Chapter 15. Quantum Mechanics as a Theory of Probability (Meir Hemmo, Orly Shenker) Chapter 16. On the Three Types of Bell's Inequalities (Gábor Hofer-Szabó) Chapter 17. On the Descriptive Power of Probability Logic (Ehud Hrushovski) Chapter 18. The Argument against Quantum Computers (Gil Kalai) Chapter 19. Why a Relativistic Quantum Mechanical World Must be Indeterministic (Avi Levy, Meir Hemmo) Chapter 20. Subjectivists about Quantum Probabilities Should be Realists about Quantum States (Wayne C. Myrvold) Chapter 21. The Relativistic Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen Argument (Michael Redhead) Chapter 22. What price statistical independence? How Einstein missed the photon.(Simon Saunders) Chapter 23. How (Maximally) Contextual is Quantum Mechanics? (Andrew W. Simmons) Chapter 24. Roots and (Re)Sources of Value (In)Definiteness Versus Contextuality (Karl Svozil) Chapter 25: Schrödinger’s Reaction to the EPR Paper (Jos Uffink) Chapter 26. Derivations of the Born Rule (Lev Vaidman) Chapter 27. Dynamical States and the Conventionality of (Non-) Classicality (Alexander Wilce).
Accuracy and the Laws of Credence
Accuracy and the Laws of Credence - read free eBook in online reader or directly download on the web page. Select files or add your book in reader. Download and read online ebook Accuracy and the Laws of Credence write by Richard Pettigrew. This book was released on 2016. Accuracy and the Laws of Credence available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Richard Pettigrew offers an extended investigation into a particular way of justifying the rational principles that govern our credences (or degrees of belief). The main principles that he justifies are the central tenets of Bayesian epistemology, though many other related principles are discussed along the way. These are: Probabilism, the claims that credences should obey the laws of probability; the Principal Principle, which says how credences in hypotheses about the objective chances should relate to credences in other propositions; the Principle of Indifference, which says that, in the absence of evidence, we should distribute our credences equally over all possibilities we entertain; and Conditionalization, the Bayesian account of how we should plan to respond when we receive new evidence. Ultimately, then, this book is a study in the foundations of Bayesianism. To justify these principles, Pettigrew looks to decision theory. He treats an agent's credences as if they were a choice she makes between different options, gives an account of the purely epistemic utility enjoyed by different sets of credences, and then appeals to the principles of decision theory to show that, when epistemic utility is measured in this way, the credences that violate the principles listed above are ruled out as irrational. The account of epistemic utility set out here is the veritist's: the sole fundamental source of epistemic utility for credences is their accuracy. Thus, Pettigrew conducts an investigation in the version of epistemic utility theory known as accuracy-first epistemology. The book can also be read as an extended reply on behalf of the veritist to the evidentialist's objection that veritism cannot account for certain evidential principles of credal rationality, such as the Principal Principle, the Principle of Indifference, and Conditionalization.
