Coalition Formation and Social Choice - read free eBook in online reader or directly download on the web page. Select files or add your book in reader. Download and read online ebook Coalition Formation and Social Choice write by Ad M.A. Van Deemen. This book was released on 2013-03-09. Coalition Formation and Social Choice available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Coalition Formation and Social Choice provides a unified and comprehensive study of coalition formation and collective decision-making in committees. It discusses the main existing theories including the size principle, conflict of interest theory, dominant player theory, policy distance theory and power excess theory. In addition, the book offers new theories of coalition formation in which the endogenous formation of preferences for coalitions is basic. Both simple game theory and social choice theory are extensively applied in the treatment of the theories. This combined application not only leads to new theories but also offers a new and fresh perspective on coalition formation and collective decision-making in committees. The book covers the fundamental concepts and results of social choice theory including Arrow's Impossibility Theorem. Furthermore, it gives a coherent treatment of the theory of simple games. Besides more traditional topics in simple game theory like power indices, it also introduces new aspects of simple games such as the Chow parameter, the Chow vector and the notion of similar games.
Coalition Formation and Social Choice
Coalition Formation and Social Choice - read free eBook in online reader or directly download on the web page. Select files or add your book in reader. Download and read online ebook Coalition Formation and Social Choice write by Ad van Deemen. This book was released on 1991. Coalition Formation and Social Choice available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle.
Handbook of Computational Social Choice
Handbook of Computational Social Choice - read free eBook in online reader or directly download on the web page. Select files or add your book in reader. Download and read online ebook Handbook of Computational Social Choice write by Felix Brandt. This book was released on 2016-04-25. Handbook of Computational Social Choice available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. The rapidly growing field of computational social choice, at the intersection of computer science and economics, deals with the computational aspects of collective decision making. This handbook, written by thirty-six prominent members of the computational social choice community, covers the field comprehensively. Chapters devoted to each of the field's major themes offer detailed introductions. Topics include voting theory (such as the computational complexity of winner determination and manipulation in elections), fair allocation (such as algorithms for dividing divisible and indivisible goods), coalition formation (such as matching and hedonic games), and many more. Graduate students, researchers, and professionals in computer science, economics, mathematics, political science, and philosophy will benefit from this accessible and self-contained book.
Collective Decision-Making:
Collective Decision-Making: - read free eBook in online reader or directly download on the web page. Select files or add your book in reader. Download and read online ebook Collective Decision-Making: write by Norman Schofield. This book was released on 2013-03-09. Collective Decision-Making: available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. In the last decade the techniques of social choice theory, game theory and positive political theory have been combined in interesting ways so as to pro vide a common framework for analyzing the behavior of a developed political economy. Social choice theory itself grew out of the innovative attempts by Ken neth Arrow (1951) and Duncan Black (1948, 1958) to extend the range of economic theory in order to deal with collective decision-making over public goods. Later work, by William Baumol (1952), and James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock (1962), focussed on providing an "economic" interpretation of democratic institutions. In the same period Anthony Downs (1957) sought to model representative democracy and elections while William Riker (1962) made use of work in cooperative game theory (by John von Neumann and Oscar Morgenstern, 1944) to study coalition behavior. In my view, these "rational choice" analyses of collective decision-making have their antecedents in the arguments of Adam Smith (1759, 1776), James Madison (1787) and the Marquis de Condorcet (1785) about the "design" of political institutions. In the introductory chapter to this volume I briefly describe how some of the current normative and positive aspects of social choice date back to these earlier writers.
A Game-Theoretic Perspective on Coalition Formation
A Game-Theoretic Perspective on Coalition Formation - read free eBook in online reader or directly download on the web page. Select files or add your book in reader. Download and read online ebook A Game-Theoretic Perspective on Coalition Formation write by Debraj Ray. This book was released on 2007-11. A Game-Theoretic Perspective on Coalition Formation available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Drawing upon and extending his inaugural Lipsey Lectures, Debraj Ray looks at coalition formation from the perspective of game theory. Ray brings together developments in both cooperative and noncooperative game theory to study the analytics of coalition formation and binding agreements.
