Designing Real-Time Feedback for Bidders in Homogeneous-Item Continuous Combinatorial Auctions - read free eBook in online reader or directly download on the web page. Select files or add your book in reader. Download and read online ebook Designing Real-Time Feedback for Bidders in Homogeneous-Item Continuous Combinatorial Auctions write by Gediminas Adomavicius. This book was released on 2018. Designing Real-Time Feedback for Bidders in Homogeneous-Item Continuous Combinatorial Auctions available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Although combinatorial auctions are important mechanisms for many specialized applications, their adoption in general-purpose marketplaces is still fairly limited, partly due to the inherent difficulty in evaluating the efficacy of bids without the availability of comprehensive bidder support. In this paper, we present both theoretical results and computational designs to support real-time feedback to bidders in continuous combinatorial auctions, where bidders are free to join and leave the auction at any time. In particular, we focus on the broad class of single-item multi-unit (SIMU) combinatorial auctions, where multiple identical units of one homogenous item are being auctioned. We also consider two common ways to express bidding preferences: OR bids and XOR bids. For SIMU auctions with each of the two bid types, we present comprehensive analyses of auction dynamics, which can determine winning bids that satisfy allocative fairness, and compute critical evaluative metrics needed to provide bidder support, including bid winning and deadness levels. We also design the data structures and algorithms needed to provide bidder support in real-time for SIMU auctions of practically relevant sizes. The computational tools proposed in this paper can facilitate the efficient and more transparent implementation of SIMU combinatorial auctions in business- and consumer-oriented markets.
Design Implications of Real-time Feedback in Continuous Combinatorial Auctions
Design Implications of Real-time Feedback in Continuous Combinatorial Auctions - read free eBook in online reader or directly download on the web page. Select files or add your book in reader. Download and read online ebook Design Implications of Real-time Feedback in Continuous Combinatorial Auctions write by Pallab Sanyal. This book was released on 2009. Design Implications of Real-time Feedback in Continuous Combinatorial Auctions available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle.
Combinatorial Auctions
Combinatorial Auctions - read free eBook in online reader or directly download on the web page. Select files or add your book in reader. Download and read online ebook Combinatorial Auctions write by Peter C. Cramton. This book was released on 2006. Combinatorial Auctions available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. A synthesis of theoretical and practical research on combinatorial auctions from the perspectives of economics, operations research, and computer science.
Handbook of Spectrum Auction Design
Handbook of Spectrum Auction Design - read free eBook in online reader or directly download on the web page. Select files or add your book in reader. Download and read online ebook Handbook of Spectrum Auction Design write by Martin Bichler. This book was released on 2017-10-26. Handbook of Spectrum Auction Design available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. An international team of experts covers the pros and cons of different auction formats and lessons learned in the field.
Putting Auction Theory to Work
Putting Auction Theory to Work - read free eBook in online reader or directly download on the web page. Select files or add your book in reader. Download and read online ebook Putting Auction Theory to Work write by Paul Milgrom. This book was released on 2004-01-12. Putting Auction Theory to Work available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. This book provides a comprehensive introduction to modern auction theory and its important new applications. It is written by a leading economic theorist whose suggestions guided the creation of the new spectrum auction designs. Aimed at graduate students and professionals in economics, the book gives the most up-to-date treatments of both traditional theories of 'optimal auctions' and newer theories of multi-unit auctions and package auctions, and shows by example how these theories are used. The analysis explores the limitations of prominent older designs, such as the Vickrey auction design, and evaluates the practical responses to those limitations. It explores the tension between the traditional theory of auctions with a fixed set of bidders, in which the seller seeks to squeeze as much revenue as possible from the fixed set, and the theory of auctions with endogenous entry, in which bidder profits must be respected to encourage participation.
