Essays on Dynamic Mechanism Design - read free eBook in online reader or directly download on the web page. Select files or add your book in reader. Download and read online ebook Essays on Dynamic Mechanism Design write by Konrad Mierendorff. This book was released on 2010. Essays on Dynamic Mechanism Design available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle.
Essays on Dynamic Mechanism Design
Essays on Dynamic Mechanism Design - read free eBook in online reader or directly download on the web page. Select files or add your book in reader. Download and read online ebook Essays on Dynamic Mechanism Design write by Heng Liu. This book was released on 2015. Essays on Dynamic Mechanism Design available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. This dissertation is a collection of two papers studying both the theoretical and the applied aspects of dynamic mechanism design. In Chapter 1, we address the problem of implementing socially efficient allocations in dynamic environments with interdependent valuations and evolving private information. In the case where the agents' information is correlated across time, we construct efficient and incentive compatible direct dynamic mechanisms. Unlike the mechanisms with history-independent transfers in the existing literature, these mechanisms feature history-dependent transfers. Moreover, they are reminiscent of the classical VCG (Vickrey-Clarke-Groves) mechanism, even though the latter is not incentive compatible with interdependent valuations. In settings where agents' private information evolves independently, we construct the dynamic counterpart of the generalized VCG mechanism in one-dimensional environments. In Chapter 2, we study the problem of designing efficient trade agreements when countries involved in trade can use "disguised protections" in the form of domestic policies. We take a dynamic mechanism design approach to examine the interaction between trade and domestic policies. In particular, we show that allowing countries to make transfers can solve the incentive problems associated with private information. However, due to lack of commitment, these transfers may or may not be self-enforcing, depending on the persistence countries' private information. Our results indicate the possibility for WTO to improve the existing trade agreements through financial transfers.
Essays on Dynamic Mechanism Design
Essays on Dynamic Mechanism Design - read free eBook in online reader or directly download on the web page. Select files or add your book in reader. Download and read online ebook Essays on Dynamic Mechanism Design write by Anqi Li. This book was released on 2012. Essays on Dynamic Mechanism Design available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. This dissertation advocates dynamic mechanism design as a useful tool to tackle theoretical challenges in microeconomics and to solve real world institutional design problems. It is composed of two chapters. In the first chapter, I study durable goods sales with a dynamic population of buyers. My contribution is to devise a Multi-round Simultaneous Ascending Auction with Generalized Reserve Price (MSAAGR) to implement the efficient allocation, and to contrast MSAAGR with the standard uniform price auction to highlight the implication of population dynamics on the design of trading platforms. In the second chapter, I estalibsh the possibility of sustaining long-term cooperation in infinitely repeated private monitoring games with scarce signals. My contribution is to construct a novel Budget Mechanism with Cross-Checking (BMCC) which, by linking players' action choices over time, virtually implements the efficient outcome with a vanishing incentive cost as the horizon of the game grows and the players become increasingly patient.
Essays on Sequential Auctions and Dynamic Mechanism Design
Essays on Sequential Auctions and Dynamic Mechanism Design - read free eBook in online reader or directly download on the web page. Select files or add your book in reader. Download and read online ebook Essays on Sequential Auctions and Dynamic Mechanism Design write by Maher Riyad Said. This book was released on 2009. Essays on Sequential Auctions and Dynamic Mechanism Design available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle.
Essays on Dynamic Games and Mechanism Design
Essays on Dynamic Games and Mechanism Design - read free eBook in online reader or directly download on the web page. Select files or add your book in reader. Download and read online ebook Essays on Dynamic Games and Mechanism Design write by Ruitian Lang. This book was released on 2014. Essays on Dynamic Games and Mechanism Design available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. The dissertation considers three topics in dynamic games and mechanism design. In both problems, asymmetric information causes inefficiency in production and allocation. The first chapter considers the inefficiency from the principal's inability to observes the agent's effort or cost of effort, and explores its implication to the principal's response to the combination of the output and the signal about the cost of effort. For example, the principal may punish the agent more harshly for low output when signals suggest that cost of effort is high when the effort is of high value for the principal. This chapter also classifies the long-run behavior of the relationship between the principal and the agent. Depending on whether the agent is strictly risk-averse and whether he is protected by limited liability, the state of the relationship may or may not converge to a stationary state and the stationary state may nor may not depend on the initial condition. The second chapter considers the re-allocation of assets among entrepreneurs with different matching qualities, which contributes to the growth of the whole economy. Due to reasons that are not explicitly modeled, assets are not automatically allocated to entrepreneurs who are best at operating them from the beginning, and this inefficiency is combined with inefficiency in the asset market and potential imperfection of labor contracting. When asset re-allocation can become a main source of economic growth, this chapter argues that imperfection in the labor contracting environment may boost the economic growth. The third chapter assumes that the agent's output is contractible but he can privately acquire more information about his cost of production prior to contracting. Compared to the optimal screening contract, the principal's contract in this case must not only induce the agent to "tell the truth", but also to give the agent the incentive to acquire appropriate amount of information. This may create distortion of allocation to the most efficient type and whether this happens is related to the marginal loss incurred by the principal from the cost of information acquisition.
