Essays on Information Economics and Mechanism Design - read free eBook in online reader or directly download on the web page. Select files or add your book in reader. Download and read online ebook Essays on Information Economics and Mechanism Design write by Fangrui Ouyang. This book was released on 2010. Essays on Information Economics and Mechanism Design available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle.
Essays in Information Economics
Essays in Information Economics - read free eBook in online reader or directly download on the web page. Select files or add your book in reader. Download and read online ebook Essays in Information Economics write by Agathe Alysse Pernoud. This book was released on 2023. Essays in Information Economics available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. This dissertation comprises three essays in information economics. Each essay employs tools from mechanism design and game theory to examine individuals' incentives when acquiring information and when sharing that information with others. The first chapter considers a mechanism design setting in which agents can obtain costly information about their own preferences and those of others. A mechanism is informationally simple if agents have no incentive to learn about others' preferences. This property is of interest for two reasons: First, it is a necessary condition for the existence of dominant strategy equilibria in the extended game. Second, it endogenizes an "independent private value" property of the interim information structure. We show that, generically, a mechanism is informationally simple if and only if it satisfies a separability condition which rules out most economically meaningful mechanisms. The second chapter examines auctions in which buyers can acquire costly information about their own valuations and those of others, and investigates how competition among buyers shapes their learning incentives. In equilibrium, buyers find it cost-efficient to acquire some information about their competitors so as to only learn their valuations when they have a fair chance of winning. We show that such learning incentives make competition between buyers less effective: losing buyers often fail to learn their valuations precisely and, as a result, compete less aggressively for the good. The third chapter deviates from the preceding two by focusing on how individuals communicate with each other. It seeks to understand how individuals' subjective models of the world, or worldviews, affect communication.
Essays on Mechanism Design and Experimental Economics
Essays on Mechanism Design and Experimental Economics - read free eBook in online reader or directly download on the web page. Select files or add your book in reader. Download and read online ebook Essays on Mechanism Design and Experimental Economics write by Ludwig Ensthaler. This book was released on 2011. Essays on Mechanism Design and Experimental Economics available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Doctoral thesis Humboldt University Berlin.
Social Design
Social Design - read free eBook in online reader or directly download on the web page. Select files or add your book in reader. Download and read online ebook Social Design write by Walter Trockel. This book was released on 2019-05-30. Social Design available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. This book contains invited essays in memory of Leonid Hurwicz spanning a large area of economic, social and other sciences where the implementation or enforcement of institutions and rules requires the design of effective mechanisms. The foundations of these articles are set by social choice concepts; game theory; Nash, Bayesian and Walrasian equilibria; complete and incomplete information. Besides in-depth treatments of well-established parts of mechanism and implementation theory, contributions on novel directions deal, for instance, with a quantum approach to game and decision making under uncertainty; digitalization; and the design of block chain for trading. The outstanding competence and reputation of the authors reflect the appreciation of the fundamental contributions and the lasting admiration of the personality and the work of Leonid Hurwicz.
Organization with Incomplete Information
Organization with Incomplete Information - read free eBook in online reader or directly download on the web page. Select files or add your book in reader. Download and read online ebook Organization with Incomplete Information write by Mukul Majumdar. This book was released on 1998-09-13. Organization with Incomplete Information available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. There have been systematic attempts over the last twenty-five years to explore the implications of decision making with incomplete information and to model an 'economic man' as an information-processing organism. These efforts are associated with the work of Roy Radner, who joins other analysts in this collection to offer accessible overviews of the existing literature on topics such as Walrasian equilibrium with incomplete markets, rational expectations equilibrium, learning, Markovian games, dynamic game-theoretic models of organization, and experimental work on mechanism selection. Some essays also take up relatively new themes related to bounded rationality, complexity of decisions, and economic survival. The collection overall introduces models that add to the toolbox of economists, expand the boundaries of economic analysis, and enrich our understanding of the inefficiencies and complexities of organizational design in the presence of uncertainty.
