Essays on Information in Dynamic Games and Mechanism Design - read free eBook in online reader or directly download on the web page. Select files or add your book in reader. Download and read online ebook Essays on Information in Dynamic Games and Mechanism Design write by Daehyun Kim. This book was released on 2019. Essays on Information in Dynamic Games and Mechanism Design available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. This dissertation studies how asymmetric information between economic agents interacts with their incentive in dynamic games and mechanism design. Chapter 1 and Chapter 2 study this in mechanism design, especially focusing on robustness of mechanisms when a mechanism designer's knowledge on agents' belief and higher order beliefs is not perfect. In Chapter 1 we introduce a novel robustness notion into mechanism design, which we term confident implementation; and characterize confidently implementable social choice correspondences. In Chapter 2, we introduce another robust notion, p-dominant implementation where p [0, 1]N and N N is the number of agents, and fully characterize p-dominant implementable allocations in the quasilinear environment. Chapter 1 and Chapter 2 are related in the following way: for some range of p, a p-dominant implementable social choice correspondence is confidently implementable. In Chapter 3, we study information disclosure problem to manage reputation. To study this, we consider a repeated game in which there are a long-run player and a stream of short-run players; and the long-run player has private information about her type, which is either commitment or normal. We assume that the shot-run player only can observe the past K N periods of information disclosed by the long-run player. In this environment, we characterize the information disclosure behavior of the long-run player and also equilibrium dynamics whose shape critically depends on the prior.
Essays on Dynamic Games and Mechanism Design
Essays on Dynamic Games and Mechanism Design - read free eBook in online reader or directly download on the web page. Select files or add your book in reader. Download and read online ebook Essays on Dynamic Games and Mechanism Design write by Ruitian Lang. This book was released on 2014. Essays on Dynamic Games and Mechanism Design available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. The dissertation considers three topics in dynamic games and mechanism design. In both problems, asymmetric information causes inefficiency in production and allocation. The first chapter considers the inefficiency from the principal's inability to observes the agent's effort or cost of effort, and explores its implication to the principal's response to the combination of the output and the signal about the cost of effort. For example, the principal may punish the agent more harshly for low output when signals suggest that cost of effort is high when the effort is of high value for the principal. This chapter also classifies the long-run behavior of the relationship between the principal and the agent. Depending on whether the agent is strictly risk-averse and whether he is protected by limited liability, the state of the relationship may or may not converge to a stationary state and the stationary state may nor may not depend on the initial condition. The second chapter considers the re-allocation of assets among entrepreneurs with different matching qualities, which contributes to the growth of the whole economy. Due to reasons that are not explicitly modeled, assets are not automatically allocated to entrepreneurs who are best at operating them from the beginning, and this inefficiency is combined with inefficiency in the asset market and potential imperfection of labor contracting. When asset re-allocation can become a main source of economic growth, this chapter argues that imperfection in the labor contracting environment may boost the economic growth. The third chapter assumes that the agent's output is contractible but he can privately acquire more information about his cost of production prior to contracting. Compared to the optimal screening contract, the principal's contract in this case must not only induce the agent to "tell the truth", but also to give the agent the incentive to acquire appropriate amount of information. This may create distortion of allocation to the most efficient type and whether this happens is related to the marginal loss incurred by the principal from the cost of information acquisition.
Dynamic Games and Mechanisms with Serially Dependent Private Information
Dynamic Games and Mechanisms with Serially Dependent Private Information - read free eBook in online reader or directly download on the web page. Select files or add your book in reader. Download and read online ebook Dynamic Games and Mechanisms with Serially Dependent Private Information write by Juuso Tuomas Toikka. This book was released on 2010. Dynamic Games and Mechanisms with Serially Dependent Private Information available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. This dissertation consists of three essays. In "A Folk Theorem with Markovian Private Information" (with Juan F. Escobar) we consider repeated Bayesian two-player games in which the players' types evolve according to an irreducible Markov chain, type transitions are independent across players, and players have private values. The main result shows that, with communication, any Pareto efficient payoff vector above a minmax value can be approximated arbitrarily closely in a perfect Bayesian equilibrium as the discount factor goes to one. In the second essay, "Dynamic Mechanism Design: Incentive Compatibility, Profit Maximization, and Information Disclosure" (with Alessandro Pavan and Ilya R. Segal), we examine the design of dynamic screening mechanisms for environments in which the agents' types follow a stochastic process, decisions may be made over time, and the decisions may affect the type process. We derive a formula for an agent's equilibrium payoff in an incentive-compatible mechanism, which generalizes Mirrlees's envelope formula of static mechanism design. When specialized to quasi-linear environments, the formula yields a dynamic revenue-equivalence result and an expression for dynamic virtual surplus, which is instrumental for the design of profit-maximizing mechanisms. We also provide sufficient conditions for incentive compatibility. We apply the results to derive optimal dynamic contracts for a number of novel settings. The final essay, "Ironing without Control, " extends a method for solving a class of optimization problems, encountered frequently in mechanism design, where a functional is maximized over the set of nondecreasing functions. For example, the approach can be used to solve principal-agent models with adverse selection.
Incentives and Institutions
Incentives and Institutions - read free eBook in online reader or directly download on the web page. Select files or add your book in reader. Download and read online ebook Incentives and Institutions write by Serkan Kucuksenel. This book was released on 2009. Incentives and Institutions available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle.
Essays on Dynamic Mechanism Design
Essays on Dynamic Mechanism Design - read free eBook in online reader or directly download on the web page. Select files or add your book in reader. Download and read online ebook Essays on Dynamic Mechanism Design write by Konrad Mierendorff. This book was released on 2010. Essays on Dynamic Mechanism Design available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle.
