Essays on Sequential Auctions and Dynamic Mechanism Design - read free eBook in online reader or directly download on the web page. Select files or add your book in reader. Download and read online ebook Essays on Sequential Auctions and Dynamic Mechanism Design write by Maher Riyad Said. This book was released on 2009. Essays on Sequential Auctions and Dynamic Mechanism Design available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle.
Sponsored Search and Sequential Auctions
Sponsored Search and Sequential Auctions - read free eBook in online reader or directly download on the web page. Select files or add your book in reader. Download and read online ebook Sponsored Search and Sequential Auctions write by Emmanuel Lorenzon. This book was released on 2016. Sponsored Search and Sequential Auctions available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. This thesis is a collection of three essays in theoretical auction analysis. Chapter 1 considersbid delegation in the GSP auction mechanism. In a game involving side-contracts and a compensationpolicy set by an agency, the first-best collusive outcome is achieved. We offer a characterization of the implementablebid profiles for the two-position game with three players. Chapter 2 considers the sequentialsale of an object to two buyers: one knows his private information and the other buyer does not. Buyershave a multi-unit demand and private valuations for each unit are perfectly correlated. An asymmetricequilibrium exists when the uninformed player adopts an aggressive bidding strategy. Conversely, hisinformed opponent behaves more conservatively by using bid shading. The bidding behaviour of theuninformed bidder is driven by the opportunity to learn his private valuation for free. This dynamic is atthe root of the decline in the equilibrium price across both sales. In chapter 3, information is observableduring the first-stage auction in a sequential-move game in which the first-mover bidder is observed byhis opponent. A separating equilibrium exists in which the informed bidder bids aggressively when he isthe first-mover which entails a non-participation strategy from his uninformed competitor. Conversely,the latter adopts a conservative behaviour when he is the first-mover. A pooling equilibrium in which theinformed bidder blurs his valuation can only exist if his uninformed opponent adopts a non-participatingstrategy.
Essays on Mechanism Design
Essays on Mechanism Design - read free eBook in online reader or directly download on the web page. Select files or add your book in reader. Download and read online ebook Essays on Mechanism Design write by Filippo Balestrieri. This book was released on 2008. Essays on Mechanism Design available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. (cont.) In Chapter 3 we initiate the formal analysis of the First Price-First Score Auction in a general context where the auctioneer is a seller and two bidders compete to buy one indivisible good. The auctioneer's preferences are assumed to directly depend on the identity of the buyer to whom the good is allocated. In this auction, the bidders submit monetary bids, and then the seller decides which bid to accept after comparing the bidders' scores. A particular class of auction we focus on have simple scoring functions: each bidder's score is given by the summation of his bid and a bidder-specific additional parameter. Our main goal is to obtain the specification of the problem that generates a closed-form analytical solutions for the bidding strategies. The task is complicated as there are at least two sources of asymmetries inherent to the problem that can quickly lead to intractable formulas. The main contribution of this work is to provide closed formulas for the inverse bidding functions. Our results generalize the comparison of bidding strategies in asymmetric first price auctions obtained by Maskin and Riley (2002). Even if the asymmetry between the bidders is exogenously introduced by the auctioneer, in equilibrium the disadvantaged bidder bids more aggressively. We are also able to determine the ranges of bids that can be submitted by the two bidders. They are actually different, and their extremes depend on the extra-bid parameter.
Three Essays on Auctions and Mechanism Design
Three Essays on Auctions and Mechanism Design - read free eBook in online reader or directly download on the web page. Select files or add your book in reader. Download and read online ebook Three Essays on Auctions and Mechanism Design write by Luke Hu. This book was released on 2014-01-28. Three Essays on Auctions and Mechanism Design available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle.
Three Essays
Three Essays - read free eBook in online reader or directly download on the web page. Select files or add your book in reader. Download and read online ebook Three Essays write by Rong Chen. This book was released on 2003. Three Essays available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle.
