Essays on Structural Analysis of Procurement Auctions - read free eBook in online reader or directly download on the web page. Select files or add your book in reader. Download and read online ebook Essays on Structural Analysis of Procurement Auctions write by Bin Yu. This book was released on 2007. Essays on Structural Analysis of Procurement Auctions available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. This dissertation addresses the empirical analysis of procurements based on the auction theory, which is known as the structural-form analysis of procurement auctions.
Three Essays on Multi-round Procurement Auctions
Three Essays on Multi-round Procurement Auctions - read free eBook in online reader or directly download on the web page. Select files or add your book in reader. Download and read online ebook Three Essays on Multi-round Procurement Auctions write by Lu Ji. This book was released on 2006. Three Essays on Multi-round Procurement Auctions available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. My dissertation contributes to auction studies. It analyzes the bidding behavior in multi-round auctions. It is motivated by an interesting multi-round feature observed in the procurement auctions held by the Indiana Department of Transportation (INDOT hereafter), which adopts secret reserve prices. Prior research has indicated that auctions with reserve prices usually lead to no trade. However, prior research has not paid much attention to the possibility that the seller can auction unsold objects from previous rounds and a trade is therefore still likely to occur. My dissertation provides new theoretical and empirical analyses of auctions with multiple rounds. It first develops a game-theoretic bidding model for the multi-round auctions with non-forward looking bidders. It then establishes a structural econometric model in order to conduct a structural analysis of the INDOT data. Lastly it introduces dynamic features into the model by assuming that bidders are forward looking and uses a dynamic control approach to analyze the bidding behavior and policy issues. The main findings are: (1) rational bidders reduce their markup across periods in multi-round auctions; (2) simulations show that using secret reserve price is sometimes better than public reserve price for the procurement auctioneer; (3) counterfactual analyses indicate that on one hand, when bidders are not forward looking, it is better for the INDOT to use a secret reserve price; on the other hand, when bidders are forward looking, it is better for the INDOT to use a secret reserve price when the discount factor is low and to use a public reserve price when the discount factor is sufficiently high.
Essays on the Structural Analysis of Selection and Search
Essays on the Structural Analysis of Selection and Search - read free eBook in online reader or directly download on the web page. Select files or add your book in reader. Download and read online ebook Essays on the Structural Analysis of Selection and Search write by Matthew Loren Gentry. This book was released on 2012. Essays on the Structural Analysis of Selection and Search available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle.
Essays in auctions and procurement
Essays in auctions and procurement - read free eBook in online reader or directly download on the web page. Select files or add your book in reader. Download and read online ebook Essays in auctions and procurement write by George M. Deltas. This book was released on 1996. Essays in auctions and procurement available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle.
Essays on the Structural Analysis of Auction Markets
Essays on the Structural Analysis of Auction Markets - read free eBook in online reader or directly download on the web page. Select files or add your book in reader. Download and read online ebook Essays on the Structural Analysis of Auction Markets write by Marleen Renske Marra. This book was released on 2019. Essays on the Structural Analysis of Auction Markets available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. This thesis presents new results that make significant contributions to the structural analysis of auction markets. One chapter develops a methodology to study welfare and revenue impacts of fees in auction platforms. The impacts of fees are theoretically ambiguous as the platform faces a ``two-sided market'' with network effects; increased seller entry raises its value to bidders, and vice versa. The chapter develops and solves a structural model with endogenous bidder and seller entry, seller selection, and costly listing inspection. It also exploits an original dataset with 15 months of wine auctions to study these issues. Relevant model primitives are shown to be identified in the auction platform model from observed variation in reserve prices, transaction prices, and the number of bidders. The proposed estimation strategy combines methods from the auction and discrete choice literatures. Model estimates reveal significant network effects, and it is shown with counterfactual policy simulations that fee structures that subsidize bidders make all parties better off. Implications for competition policy are discussed as well. Another chapter focuses on nonparametric identification in English auctions with absentee bidding, in which the number of bidders is unknown. The chapter exploits additional identifying variation from drop-out values of absentee bidders and develops a novel nonparametric identification approach based on the stochastic spacing of order statistics. In combination with a shape restriction the method delivers bounds on both the latent valuation distribution and expected consumer surplus. The value of the proposed method is highlighted by showing that it identifies informative bounds on policy-relevant model primitives in a sample of traditional English auctions collected from the online bidding portal of Sotheby's, which does not contain the number of bidders and their final bids. The thesis ends by providing directions for future research.
