Essays on the Empirical Analysis of Auctions - read free eBook in online reader or directly download on the web page. Select files or add your book in reader. Download and read online ebook Essays on the Empirical Analysis of Auctions write by Bjarne Brendstrup. This book was released on 2005. Essays on the Empirical Analysis of Auctions available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle.
Essays in the Empirical Analysis of Auction Markets
Essays in the Empirical Analysis of Auction Markets - read free eBook in online reader or directly download on the web page. Select files or add your book in reader. Download and read online ebook Essays in the Empirical Analysis of Auction Markets write by Ali Hortaçsu. This book was released on 2001. Essays in the Empirical Analysis of Auction Markets available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle.
Essays in the Empirical Analysis of Selling Mechanisms
Essays in the Empirical Analysis of Selling Mechanisms - read free eBook in online reader or directly download on the web page. Select files or add your book in reader. Download and read online ebook Essays in the Empirical Analysis of Selling Mechanisms write by Caio Waisman. This book was released on 2018. Essays in the Empirical Analysis of Selling Mechanisms available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. This dissertation empirically investigates the performance of different selling mechanisms. The first chapter addresses the tradeoff between auctions ans posted prices in the context of a scarce perishable good. It makes use of data on National Football League tickets offered at eBay and leverages the within-seller and within-product variation in mechanism choice to estimate a dynamic structural model in which heterogeneous, forward-looking sellers optimally choose between the different mechanisms and their features. Counterfactual results suggest that sellers would experience an average 87.75% decrease in expected revenues if auctions were removed and an almost 13% decrease if posted prices were. In turn, consumers would benefit from an auction-only platform since the expected number of transactions would increase and expected transaction prices would decrease. The second chapter is co-authored with Dom Coey, Brad Larsen, and Kane Sweeney and it focuses on online auctions. In particular, the majority of these auctions are effectively second-price auctions, which implies that to implement the optimal mechanism the seller's problem boils down to choosing the optimal reserve price. Hence, we propose a set of estimators to discover what the optimal reserve price should be and which remain valid under general conditions. We establish the asymptotic properties of these estimators, propose a learning policy for sellers who run absolute auctions to gather data to estimate what reserve price they should use, and illustrate our tools using data from eBay on smartphones. Finally, we also discuss how the approach we propose can be extended to explicitly account for asymmetric bidders and implement the Myerson (1981) optimal auction. The final chapter is also co-authored with Dom Coey, Brad Larsen, and Kane Sweeney. It addresses the empirical analysis of ascending auctions, which is often complicated by severe data restrictions. In particular, we extend the methodology proposed by Aradillas-López et al. (2013) by first proving it remains valid under bidder asymmetries even when the identities of bidders are not observed and then by showing how this information, when available, can be used to improve upon existing tools. We demonstrate the advantages of this approach using USFS timber auctions.
Three Essays on All-pay Auctions
Three Essays on All-pay Auctions - read free eBook in online reader or directly download on the web page. Select files or add your book in reader. Download and read online ebook Three Essays on All-pay Auctions write by Minbo Xu. This book was released on 2013. Three Essays on All-pay Auctions available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. The dissertation includes three research papers on all-pay auctions. The first paper (Chapter 1) considers an all-pay auction for a product in which there is an option for bidders to guarantee purchases at a seller specified posted price P at any time. We find the symmetric pure-strategy equilibria in the first- and second-price all-pay auctions (also called war of attrition) with a buy-price option. Under these equilibria the buy-price option will affect high-value bidders' behavior, and improve their welfare. At the same time, the seller can select the optimal posted price to collect more revenue, and the Revenue Equivalence Theorem holds as well. The second paper (Chapter 2) conducts empirical analysis on online penny auctions, which are seen as an adaptation of the famous dollar auction and as "the evil stepchild of game theory and behavioral economics." We use the complete bid and bidder history at a website to study if penny auctions can sustain excessive profits over time. The overwhelming majority of new bidders lose money, but they quit quickly. A very small percentage of bidders are experienced and strategically sophisticated, but they earn substantial profits. Our evidence thus suggests that penny auctions cannot sustain excessive profits without attracting a revolving door of new customers who will lose money. The third paper (Chapter 3) proposes a nonparametric estimation approach to empirical analysis of the war of attrition. In order to construct a tractable model, we consider the uncertain competition and derive a structural model with a stochastic number of bidders. We admit the contamination from observables and introduce a deconvolution problem with heteroscedastic errors into the nonparametric approach. By a two-step nonparametric procedure, we can attain a consistent estimator of the distribution of bidders' private values from the observables. Finally, we apply the estimation procedure to field data from penny auctions.
Empirical Essays on the Efficiency of Heterogeneous Good Auction
Empirical Essays on the Efficiency of Heterogeneous Good Auction - read free eBook in online reader or directly download on the web page. Select files or add your book in reader. Download and read online ebook Empirical Essays on the Efficiency of Heterogeneous Good Auction write by Thomas A. Martin (IV.). This book was released on 2010. Empirical Essays on the Efficiency of Heterogeneous Good Auction available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. A recent pursuit of the auction design literature has been the development of an auction mechanism which performs well in a multi-good setting, when the goods are not substitutes. This work began in earnest with the Federal Communications Commission spectrum license auctions in the early nineties and continues to this day. In a setting in which goods are not substitutes, the value of one good depends non-negatively on the quantities of other goods that are won. This type of interdependent value structure has proven difficult to account for in auction design. However, the need for mechanisms that account for such a value structure hinges on the magnitude of the interdependence, whose computation is an empirical exercise. I identify a setting in which to perform this computation. I develop an empirical methodology that allows me to recover bidders' value functions in a multi-good auction setting. This methodology allows me to assess the magnitude of any interdependence in the goods? value structure. Since the auction setting that I analyze is a variation of the standard uniform price auction, which has been adapted for a multi-good setting, I am able to measure the benefit of having a direct revelation mechanism. This counterfactual study is performed by maximizing the value of the auction using the recovered bidder value functions. I find evidence that there is an interdependent value structure in the setting. The counterfactual auction finds that the standard uniform price auction, adapted to a multi-good setting, performs poorly in the presence of such a value structure. The setting for this analysis is an auction for financial transmission rights held in Texas in 2002. The auction involved twenty two firms and collected almost $70 million in revenue. This research is the first to empirically assess efficiency in this type of auction setting.
