Market Value Maximizing Ownership Structure when Investor Protection is Weak - read free eBook in online reader or directly download on the web page. Select files or add your book in reader. Download and read online ebook Market Value Maximizing Ownership Structure when Investor Protection is Weak write by Beni Lauterbach. This book was released on 2004. Market Value Maximizing Ownership Structure when Investor Protection is Weak available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle.
Market Value Maximizing Ownership when Investor Protection is Weak
Market Value Maximizing Ownership when Investor Protection is Weak - read free eBook in online reader or directly download on the web page. Select files or add your book in reader. Download and read online ebook Market Value Maximizing Ownership when Investor Protection is Weak write by Beni Lauterbach. This book was released on 2004. Market Value Maximizing Ownership when Investor Protection is Weak available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle.
Investor Protection and Corporate Governance
Investor Protection and Corporate Governance - read free eBook in online reader or directly download on the web page. Select files or add your book in reader. Download and read online ebook Investor Protection and Corporate Governance write by Alberto Chong. This book was released on 2007. Investor Protection and Corporate Governance available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Investor Protection in Latin America represents the largest data-gathering effort of firm-level corporate governance practices, ownership structures, and dividend policies. The results presented show that on top of country-wide legal protection of investors, there is a positive effect on valuation and performance of higher firm-level protections and better corporate governance practices. This evidence matches previous research in the area for other regions of the world.
Ownership Structure and Investor Protection
Ownership Structure and Investor Protection - read free eBook in online reader or directly download on the web page. Select files or add your book in reader. Download and read online ebook Ownership Structure and Investor Protection write by Marco Klapper. This book was released on 2013-09. Ownership Structure and Investor Protection available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Bachelor Thesis from the year 2012 in the subject Business economics - Business Management, Corporate Governance, grade: 1,3, University of Tubingen, language: English, abstract: It is the purpose of this paper to examine to what extent ownership structure can alleviate the agency problem and limit managerial expropriation of small shareholders. Since stock options and other forms of equity are frequently used as compensation for managers, special emphasis is placed on the question of how managerial ownership can affect agency costs and firm value. To evaluate the impact of ownership patterns on shareholder value, this paper surveys and reinterprets scientific advances in the corporate governance literature. A significant part of the analysis covers the interrelation of inside ownership, corporate policies, and shareholder value; as well as the role of endogeneity.
The Principle of Proportional Ownership, Investor Protection and Firm Value in Western Europe
The Principle of Proportional Ownership, Investor Protection and Firm Value in Western Europe - read free eBook in online reader or directly download on the web page. Select files or add your book in reader. Download and read online ebook The Principle of Proportional Ownership, Investor Protection and Firm Value in Western Europe write by Morten Bennedsen. This book was released on 2006. The Principle of Proportional Ownership, Investor Protection and Firm Value in Western Europe available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Previous research initiated by Claessens et al. (2002) has established a value discount of disproportional ownership structures. Due to omitted variables problems it is difficult to provide a causal interpretation of these findings. We provide a thorough analysis of this value discount in a large sample of Western European firms, which strengthens the causal interpretation that the discount is driven by incentive and entrenchment effects. First, we show that the value discount is higher in firms with low cash flow concentration, in family firms, in industries with higher amenity value and in countries with better investor protection. Second, we show that these findings are consistent with the predictions of a theoretical model of incentive and entrenchment effects. Third, we find little empirical evidence for a number of alternative omitted variable explanations, including: protection of private benefits; voting and block premia; low-liquidity discount; and, protection against uninvited takeovers. Fourth, we present the puzzling finding that the value discount is significantly higher in firms with dual class shares than in firms with pyramidal ownership. Fifth, we find no impact of disproportional ownership structures on operating performance. Finally, we discuss policy implications of these findings in relationship to the ongoing process of harmonization of the European capital markets.
