Pay Without Performance - read free eBook in online reader or directly download on the web page. Select files or add your book in reader. Download and read online ebook Pay Without Performance write by Lucian A. Bebchuk. This book was released on 2004. Pay Without Performance available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. The company is under-performing, its share price is trailing, and the CEO gets...a multi-million-dollar raise. This story is familiar, for good reason: as this book clearly demonstrates, structural flaws in corporate governance have produced widespread distortions in executive pay. Pay without Performance presents a disconcerting portrait of managers' influence over their own pay--and of a governance system that must fundamentally change if firms are to be managed in the interest of shareholders. Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried demonstrate that corporate boards have persistently failed to negotiate at arm's length with the executives they are meant to oversee. They give a richly detailed account of how pay practices--from option plans to retirement benefits--have decoupled compensation from performance and have camouflaged both the amount and performance-insensitivity of pay. Executives' unwonted influence over their compensation has hurt shareholders by increasing pay levels and, even more importantly, by leading to practices that dilute and distort managers' incentives. This book identifies basic problems with our current reliance on boards as guardians of shareholder interests. And the solution, the authors argue, is not merely to make these boards more independent of executives as recent reforms attempt to do. Rather, boards should also be made more dependent on shareholders by eliminating the arrangements that entrench directors and insulate them from their shareholders. A powerful critique of executive compensation and corporate governance, Pay without Performance points the way to restoring corporate integrity and improving corporate performance.
Optimal Executive Compensation Vs. Managerial Power
Optimal Executive Compensation Vs. Managerial Power - read free eBook in online reader or directly download on the web page. Select files or add your book in reader. Download and read online ebook Optimal Executive Compensation Vs. Managerial Power write by Michael S. Weisbach. This book was released on 2006. Optimal Executive Compensation Vs. Managerial Power available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle.
Explaining Executive Pay
Explaining Executive Pay - read free eBook in online reader or directly download on the web page. Select files or add your book in reader. Download and read online ebook Explaining Executive Pay write by Lukas Hengartner. This book was released on 2007-12-31. Explaining Executive Pay available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Lukas Hengartner shows that both firm complexity and managerial power are associated with higher pay levels. This suggests that top managers are paid for the complexity of their job and that more powerful top managers receive pay in excess of the level that would be optimal for shareholders.
Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of Executive Compensation
Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of Executive Compensation - read free eBook in online reader or directly download on the web page. Select files or add your book in reader. Download and read online ebook Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of Executive Compensation write by Lucian A. Bebchuk. This book was released on 2002. Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of Executive Compensation available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. This paper develops an account of the role and significance of managerial power and rent extraction in executive compensation. Under the optimal contracting approach to executive compensation, which has dominated academic re-search on the subject, pay arrangements are set by a board of directors that aims to maximize shareholder value. In contrast, the managerial power approach suggests that boards do not operate at arm's length in devising executive compensation arrangements; rather, executives have power to influence their own pay, and they use that power to extract rents. Furthermore, the desire to camouflage rent extraction might lead to the use of inefficient pay arrangements that provide suboptimal incentives and thereby hurt shareholder value. The authors show that the processes that produce compensation arrangements, and the various market forces and constraints that act on these processes, leave managers with considerable power to shape their own pay arrangements. Examining the large body of empirical work on executive compensation, the authors show that managerial power and the desire to camouflage rents can explain significant features of the executive compensation landscape, including ones that have long been viewed as puzzling or problematic from the optimal contracting perspective. The authors conclude that the role managerial power plays in the design of executive compensation is significant and should be taken into account in any examination of executive pay arrangements or of corporate governance generally
Research Handbook on Executive Pay
Research Handbook on Executive Pay - read free eBook in online reader or directly download on the web page. Select files or add your book in reader. Download and read online ebook Research Handbook on Executive Pay write by John S. Beasley. This book was released on 2012-01-01. Research Handbook on Executive Pay available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Research on executive compensation has exploded in recent years, and this volume of specially commissioned essays brings the reader up-to-date on all of the latest developments in the field. Leading corporate governance scholars from a range of countries set out their views on four main areas of executive compensation: the history and theory of executive compensation, the structure of executive pay, corporate governance and executive compensation, and international perspectives on executive pay. The authors analyze the two dominant theoretical approaches – managerial power theory and optimal contracting theory – and examine their impact on executive pay levels and the practices of concentrated and dispersed share ownership in corporations. The effectiveness of government regulation of executive pay and international executive pay practices in Australia, the US, Europe, China, India and Japan are also discussed. A timely study of a controversial topic, the Handbook will be an essential resource for students, scholars and practitioners of law, finance, business and accounting.
