Political Budget Cycles in New Versus Established Democracies - read free eBook in online reader or directly download on the web page. Select files or add your book in reader. Download and read online ebook Political Budget Cycles in New Versus Established Democracies write by Adi Brender. This book was released on 2004. Political Budget Cycles in New Versus Established Democracies available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. "Like other recent studies, we find the existence of a political deficit cycle in a large cross-section of countries. However, we find that this result is driven by the experience of new democracies'. The strong budget cycle in those countries accounts for the finding of a budget cycle in larger samples that include these countries; when these countries are removed from the larger sample, so that only established' democracies remain, the political budget cycle disappears. The political deficit cycle in new democracies accounts for findings in both developed and less developed economies, for the finding that the cycle is stronger in weaker democracies, and for differences in the political cycle across governmental and electoral systems. Our findings may reconcile two contradictory views of pre-electoral manipulation, one arguing it is a useful instrument to gain voter support and a widespread empirical phenomenon, the other arguing that voters punish rather than reward fiscal manipulation"--NBER website
Political Budget Cyclesin New Versus Established Democracies
Political Budget Cyclesin New Versus Established Democracies - read free eBook in online reader or directly download on the web page. Select files or add your book in reader. Download and read online ebook Political Budget Cyclesin New Versus Established Democracies write by Adi Brender. This book was released on 2005. Political Budget Cyclesin New Versus Established Democracies available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle.
Fiscal Rules to Tame the Political Budget Cycle
Fiscal Rules to Tame the Political Budget Cycle - read free eBook in online reader or directly download on the web page. Select files or add your book in reader. Download and read online ebook Fiscal Rules to Tame the Political Budget Cycle write by Lorenzo Forni. This book was released on 2017-01-20. Fiscal Rules to Tame the Political Budget Cycle available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. The paper provides evidence that fiscal rules can limit the political budget cycle. It focuses on the application of the Italian fiscal rule at the sub-national level over the period 2004-2006 and shows that: 1) municipalities are subject to political budget cycles in capital spending; 2) the Italian subnational fiscal rule introduced in 1999 has been enforced by the central government; 3) municipalities subject to the fiscal rule show more limited political budget cycles than municipalities not subject to the rule. In order to identify the effect, we rely on the fact that the domestic fiscal rule does not apply to municipalities below 5,000 inhabitants. We find that the political budget cycle increases real capital spending by about 35 percent on average in the years prior to municipal elections and that the sub-national fiscal rule reduces these figures by about two thirds.
Taxation, Responsiveness and Accountability in Sub-Saharan Africa
Taxation, Responsiveness and Accountability in Sub-Saharan Africa - read free eBook in online reader or directly download on the web page. Select files or add your book in reader. Download and read online ebook Taxation, Responsiveness and Accountability in Sub-Saharan Africa write by Wilson Prichard. This book was released on 2015-09-11. Taxation, Responsiveness and Accountability in Sub-Saharan Africa available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. It is increasingly argued that bargaining between citizens and governments over tax collection can provide a foundation for the development of responsive and accountable governance in developing countries. However, while intuitively attractive, surprisingly little research has captured the reality and complexity of this relationship in practice. This book provides the most complete treatment of the connections between taxation and accountability in developing countries, providing both new evidence and an invaluable starting point for future research. Drawing on cross-country econometric evidence and detailed case studies from Ghana, Kenya and Ethiopia, Wilson Prichard shows that reliance on taxation has, in fact, increased responsiveness and accountability by expanding the political power wielded by taxpayers. Critically, however, processes of tax bargaining have been highly varied, frequently long term and contextually contingent. Capturing this diversity provides novel insight into politics in developing countries and how tax reform can be designed to encourage broader governance gains.
Why is Economic Policy Different in New Democracies?
Why is Economic Policy Different in New Democracies? - read free eBook in online reader or directly download on the web page. Select files or add your book in reader. Download and read online ebook Why is Economic Policy Different in New Democracies? write by Adi Brender. This book was released on 2007. Why is Economic Policy Different in New Democracies? available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. When democracy is new, it is often fragile and not fully consolidated. We investigate how the danger of a collapse of democracy may affect fiscal policy in new democracies in comparison to countries where democracy is older and often more established. We argue that the attitude of the citizenry towards democracy is important in preventing democratic collapse, and expenditures may therefore be used to convince them that "democracy works". We present a model focusing on the inference problem that citizens solve in forming their beliefs about the efficacy of democracy. Our approach differs from much of the literature that concentrates on policy directed towards anti-democratic elites, but our model can encompass that view and allows comparison of different approaches. We argue that the implications of the model are broadly consistent with the empirical patterns generally observed, including the existence of political budget cycles in new democracies not observed in established democracies
