Postprivatization corporate governance : the role of ownership structure and investor protection - read free eBook in online reader or directly download on the web page. Select files or add your book in reader. Download and read online ebook Postprivatization corporate governance : the role of ownership structure and investor protection write by Narjess Boubakri. This book was released on 2003. Postprivatization corporate governance : the role of ownership structure and investor protection available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle.
Investor Protection and Corporate Governance
Investor Protection and Corporate Governance - read free eBook in online reader or directly download on the web page. Select files or add your book in reader. Download and read online ebook Investor Protection and Corporate Governance write by Alberto Chong. This book was released on 2007-06-26. Investor Protection and Corporate Governance available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. 'Investor Protection and Corporate Governance' analyzes the impact of corporate governance on firm performance and valuation. Using unique datasets gathered at the firm-level the first such data in the region and results from a homogeneous corporate governance questionnaire, the book examines corporate governance characteristics, ownership structures, dividend policies, and performance measures. The book's analysis reveals the very high levels of ownership and voting rights concentrations and monolithic governance structures in the largest samples of Latin American companies up to now, and new data emphasize the importance of specific characteristics of the investor protection regimes in several Latin American countries. By and large, those firms with better governance measures across several dimensions are granted higher valuations and thus lower cost of capital. This title will be useful to researchers, policy makers, government officials, and other professionals involved in corporate governance, economic policy, and business finance, law, and management.
Ownership Structure and Investor Protection
Ownership Structure and Investor Protection - read free eBook in online reader or directly download on the web page. Select files or add your book in reader. Download and read online ebook Ownership Structure and Investor Protection write by Marco Klapper. This book was released on 2012-06-22. Ownership Structure and Investor Protection available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Bachelor Thesis from the year 2012 in the subject Business economics - Business Management, Corporate Governance, grade: 1,3, University of Tubingen, language: English, abstract: It is the purpose of this paper to examine to what extent ownership structure can alleviate the agency problem and limit managerial expropriation of small shareholders. Since stock options and other forms of equity are frequently used as compensation for managers, special emphasis is placed on the question of how managerial ownership can affect agency costs and firm value. To evaluate the impact of ownership patterns on shareholder value, this paper surveys and reinterprets scientific advances in the corporate governance literature. A significant part of the analysis covers the interrelation of inside ownership, corporate policies, and shareholder value; as well as the role of endogeneity.
Post-Privatization Corporate Governance and Firm Performance
Post-Privatization Corporate Governance and Firm Performance - read free eBook in online reader or directly download on the web page. Select files or add your book in reader. Download and read online ebook Post-Privatization Corporate Governance and Firm Performance write by Mohammed Omran. This book was released on 2009. Post-Privatization Corporate Governance and Firm Performance available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. We examine and analyze the post-privatization corporate governance of a sample of 52 newly privatized firms from Egypt over the 1995-2005 period. We look at the ownership structure that results from privatization and its evolution; the determinants of private ownership concentration; and the impact of private ownership concentration, identity and board composition on firm performance. We find that the state gives up control over time to the private sector, but still controls, on average, more than 35 percent of these firms. We also document a trend in private ownership concentration over time, mostly for the benefit of foreign investors. Firm size, sales growth, industry affiliation, and timing and method of privatization seem to play a key role in determining private ownership concentration. Ownership concentration and ownership identity, in particular foreign investors, prove to have a positive impact on firm performance, while employees ownership concentration has a negative ones. The higher proportion of outside directors and the change in the board composition following privatization affect firm performance positively. These results could have some important policy implications; in which private ownership by foreign investors seem to add more value to firms; while selling state-owned enterprises (SOEs) to employees is not recommended. Also, the state is highly advised to relinquishes control and allow for changes in the board of director following privatization as changing ownership, per se, might not have an impact on firm performance unless it is coupled with new management style.
Market Value Maximizing Ownership Structure When Investor Protection is Weak
Market Value Maximizing Ownership Structure When Investor Protection is Weak - read free eBook in online reader or directly download on the web page. Select files or add your book in reader. Download and read online ebook Market Value Maximizing Ownership Structure When Investor Protection is Weak write by Beni Lauterbach. This book was released on 2008. Market Value Maximizing Ownership Structure When Investor Protection is Weak available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. We hypothesize that in a country with lax corporate governance rules Tobin's Q is maximized when controlholders' vote approaches the supermajority level. In this holding range controlholders do not possess extreme power (cannot pass supermajority decisions), nor do they feel a strong temptation to loot the firm (which largely belongs to them). Using a sample of 144 Israeli firms, we find that Tobin's Q is maximized when control group vote reaches 67%. This evidence is strong when ownership structure is treated as exogenous and weak when it is considered endogenous. Other ownership structure variables do not appear to have a significant valuation effect.
