Prizes Versus Contracts as Incentives for Innovation - read free eBook in online reader or directly download on the web page. Select files or add your book in reader. Download and read online ebook Prizes Versus Contracts as Incentives for Innovation write by Yeon-Koo Che. This book was released on 2015. Prizes Versus Contracts as Incentives for Innovation available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. The procurement of an innovation involves motivating a research effort to generate a new idea and then implementing that idea efficiently. If research efforts are unverifiable and implementation costs are private information, a trade-off arises between the two objectives. The optimal mechanism resolves the tradeoff via two instruments: a monetary prize and a contract to implement the project. The optimal mechanism favors the innovator in contract allocation when the value of innovation is above a certain threshold, and handicaps the innovator in contract allocation when the value of innovation is below that threshold. A monetary prize is employed as an additional incentive but only when the value of innovation is sufficiently high.
Prizes Versus Contracts as Incentives for Innovation
Prizes Versus Contracts as Incentives for Innovation - read free eBook in online reader or directly download on the web page. Select files or add your book in reader. Download and read online ebook Prizes Versus Contracts as Incentives for Innovation write by Yeon-Koo Che. This book was released on 2017. Prizes Versus Contracts as Incentives for Innovation available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Procuring an innovation involves motivating a research effort to generate a new idea and then implementing that idea effciently. If research efforts are unverifiable and implementation costs are private information, a trade-off arises between the two objectives. The optimal mechanism resolves the tradeoff via two instruments: a monetary prize and a contract to implement the project. The optimal mechanism favors the innovator in contract allocation when the value of innovation is above a certain threshold, and handicaps the innovator in contract allocation when the value of innovation is below that threshold. A monetary prize is employed as an additional incentive but only when the value of innovation is suffciently high.
The Incentives and Disincentives of Innovation Prizes
The Incentives and Disincentives of Innovation Prizes - read free eBook in online reader or directly download on the web page. Select files or add your book in reader. Download and read online ebook The Incentives and Disincentives of Innovation Prizes write by Bharat Bhushan (S. M.). This book was released on 2010. The Incentives and Disincentives of Innovation Prizes available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Technological innovation is driven by incentives. However, our understanding of how incentives actually work "on the ground" to change the level of activity of innovators or to shape the direction of their innovation is relatively limited. This thesis contributes to this understanding by focusing on innovation prizes (as applied to the energy industry). It aims to examine how prizes provide a useful but also a limiting incentive for companies in a particular arena of R&D. Specifically, the thesis involves a survey of the teams that dropped out from a highly publicized prize competition to learn about their motivations and perspectives about the competition. How companies/teams understand and evaluate the technologies that they promote involves as much understanding of the technologies as of the economic models of incentives. This thesis uses a survey based methodology to explore the impact of a particular incentive structure - prizes - on a group of teams who initially participated in the prizes and then later decided to drop out. By selecting the drop out group we were able to explore the details of the prize as an innovation mechanism in more detail. The survey results reveal that the dropped out teams believed the prize to be an opportunity to raise money for their projects. Their inability to raise enough funds and eventual dropping out did not decrease their excitement about prizes as an ideal incentive to bring about radical change even though, the dropped out teams judged the specific prize competition as less than ideal. As a consequence, the thesis concludes that the prize incentive has a close relationship with and hence extends the financial infrastructure of a society.
Federally Funded Innovation Inducement Prizes
Federally Funded Innovation Inducement Prizes - read free eBook in online reader or directly download on the web page. Select files or add your book in reader. Download and read online ebook Federally Funded Innovation Inducement Prizes write by Deborah D. Stine. This book was released on 2009-12. Federally Funded Innovation Inducement Prizes available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Contents: (1) What are the Different Kinds of Prizes?; (2) What is the Status of Federally-Funded Innovation Inducement Prizes?: DoD Wearable Power Prize; DARPA Grand Challenges; DoE Grand Challenges; Progressive Auto. X PRIZE; Amer. Le Mans Series Green Challenge Race; NASA Centennial Challenges: Astronaut Glove Challenge; General Aviation Technology; Lunar Regolith Excavation Challenge; Northrop Grumman Lunar Lander Challenge; Power Beaming and Tether; Lunar Oxygen Production or MoonROx; NASA Assessment of Program; Future Competitions; Biomed. Advanced R&D Authority Project BioShield; (3) What Policy Options Might Members of Congress Consider?: Create New Prizes; Modify Current Prize Programs.
Profit Regulation of Defense Contractors and Prizes for Innovation
Profit Regulation of Defense Contractors and Prizes for Innovation - read free eBook in online reader or directly download on the web page. Select files or add your book in reader. Download and read online ebook Profit Regulation of Defense Contractors and Prizes for Innovation write by William Paul Rogerson. This book was released on 1992. Profit Regulation of Defense Contractors and Prizes for Innovation available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. The defense sector is subject to a form of cost-based economic regulation, just as public utilities are. A set of regulations determines the price that defense contractors will receive for their products. This report describes and empirically investigates an extremely simple theory that captures an important aspect of the regulatory problem in defense contracting. The theory describes a critical difference between the regulatory problems in defense and public utilities and suggests why therefore different rules and institutions might be appropriate in each case. It also identifies several implications regarding the structuring of an optimal regulatory policy and sheds light on current policy debates over Department of Defense policy. The author empirically verifies that the incentives posited by the theory exist and are large. The theory is that profit regulation of defense contractors is structured (and necessarily must be structured) so that firms generating valuable new innovations will receive large rewards or prizes. The author attempts to establish the theoretical link between prizes and innovation and then to show that price levels induced by the current rules are large enough to make a theoretical analysis of the role of these prizes important.
