Representation of Effective Functions in Coalition Proof Nash Equilibrium - read free eBook in online reader or directly download on the web page. Select files or add your book in reader. Download and read online ebook Representation of Effective Functions in Coalition Proof Nash Equilibrium write by Hans Keiding. This book was released on 1999. Representation of Effective Functions in Coalition Proof Nash Equilibrium available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle.
Representation of Effectivity Functions in Coalition Proof Nash Equilibrium
Representation of Effectivity Functions in Coalition Proof Nash Equilibrium - read free eBook in online reader or directly download on the web page. Select files or add your book in reader. Download and read online ebook Representation of Effectivity Functions in Coalition Proof Nash Equilibrium write by Hans Keiding. This book was released on 1999. Representation of Effectivity Functions in Coalition Proof Nash Equilibrium available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle.
The Existence of a Coalition-Proof Nash Equilibrium
The Existence of a Coalition-Proof Nash Equilibrium - read free eBook in online reader or directly download on the web page. Select files or add your book in reader. Download and read online ebook The Existence of a Coalition-Proof Nash Equilibrium write by Sang-Seung Yi. This book was released on 1998. The Existence of a Coalition-Proof Nash Equilibrium available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. I provide two simple sufficient conditions under which the Pareto frontier of the Nash equilibrium set is coalition-proof. My first condition states there exists a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium which Pareto dominates all other serially undominated strategies. Under this condition, the Pareto-efficient Nash equilibrium is uniquely coalition- proof. I show that games with ordinal strategic complementarities which satisfy "ordinal monotone externalities" also satisfy the above condition. My second condition applies to games with strategic substitutabilities in equilibrium. Suppose that (1) the game has three players, or, a player's payoff depends only on his own strategy and the sum (but not the composition) of the opponents' strategies; and (2) the game has either positive externalities or negative externalities. Then the Pareto-efficient frontier of Nash equilibria is coalition-proof. Hence, under these two conditions, the common practice of the Pareto dominance refinement yields the same outcome as the coalition-proof Nash equilibrium refinement.
Computational Aspects of Cooperative Game Theory
Computational Aspects of Cooperative Game Theory - read free eBook in online reader or directly download on the web page. Select files or add your book in reader. Download and read online ebook Computational Aspects of Cooperative Game Theory write by Georgios Chalkiadakis. This book was released on 2012. Computational Aspects of Cooperative Game Theory available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Cooperative game theory is a branch of (micro-)economics that studies the behavior of self-interested agents in strategic settings where binding agreements among agents are possible. Our aim in this book is to present a survey of work on the computational aspects of cooperative game theory. We begin by formally defining transferable utility games in characteristic function form, and introducing key solution concepts such as the core and the Shapley value. We then discuss two major issues that arise when considering such games from a computational perspective: identifying compact representations for games, and the closely related problem of efficiently computing solution concepts for games. We survey several formalisms for cooperative games that have been proposed in the literature, including, for example, cooperative games defined on networks, as well as general compact representation schemes such as MC-nets and skill games. As a detailed case study, we consider weighted voting games: a widely-used and practically important class of cooperative games that inherently have a natural compact representation. We investigate the complexity of solution concepts for such games, and generalizations of them. We briefly discuss games with non-transferable utility and partition function games. We then overview algorithms for identifying welfare-maximizing coalition structures and methods used by rational agents to form coalitions (even under uncertainty), including bargaining algorithms. We conclude by considering some developing topics, applications, and future research directions.
Core Implementation in Coalition Proof Nash Equilibria
Core Implementation in Coalition Proof Nash Equilibria - read free eBook in online reader or directly download on the web page. Select files or add your book in reader. Download and read online ebook Core Implementation in Coalition Proof Nash Equilibria write by Peter Borm. This book was released on 1991. Core Implementation in Coalition Proof Nash Equilibria available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle.
