The Development of the Takeover Auction Process - read free eBook in online reader or directly download on the web page. Select files or add your book in reader. Download and read online ebook The Development of the Takeover Auction Process write by Tingting Liu. This book was released on 2018. The Development of the Takeover Auction Process available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. We study the interaction between the legal system and the takeover auction process during the 1981 to 2015 time period. We associate the strengthening of the property rights of target boards after the 1989 Time Inc. decision with fundamental changes in the takeover auction process. Following the 1989 decision, takeover auctions have moved from public and often hostile battles to a more behind the scenes, underground process where target boards control both the number of bidders and the flow of information. Target boards are more likely to initiate the auction themselves and the time between deal initiation (in private) and public deal announcement has significantly lengthened. Accounting for the increasing length of the deal initiation process, target premiums have significantly risen since 1989. Our property rights interpretation contrasts with the entrenchment story that argues that the decline in hostile takeovers has protected poorly performing management at the expense of target shareholders. Our results are consistent with the fundamental proposition of Coase (1959, 1960) that with well-defined property rights, resources flow to their highest valued use.
Putting Auction Theory to Work
Putting Auction Theory to Work - read free eBook in online reader or directly download on the web page. Select files or add your book in reader. Download and read online ebook Putting Auction Theory to Work write by Paul Milgrom. This book was released on 2004-01-12. Putting Auction Theory to Work available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. This book provides a comprehensive introduction to modern auction theory and its important new applications. It is written by a leading economic theorist whose suggestions guided the creation of the new spectrum auction designs. Aimed at graduate students and professionals in economics, the book gives the most up-to-date treatments of both traditional theories of 'optimal auctions' and newer theories of multi-unit auctions and package auctions, and shows by example how these theories are used. The analysis explores the limitations of prominent older designs, such as the Vickrey auction design, and evaluates the practical responses to those limitations. It explores the tension between the traditional theory of auctions with a fixed set of bidders, in which the seller seeks to squeeze as much revenue as possible from the fixed set, and the theory of auctions with endogenous entry, in which bidder profits must be respected to encourage participation.
Takeover Auctions with Actively Participating Targets
Takeover Auctions with Actively Participating Targets - read free eBook in online reader or directly download on the web page. Select files or add your book in reader. Download and read online ebook Takeover Auctions with Actively Participating Targets write by Yuri Khoroshilov. This book was released on 2010. Takeover Auctions with Actively Participating Targets available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. This paper provides an analysis of takeover auctions in which target firms actively participate by changing their reserve prices. It considers a takeover auction as an affiliated-value English auction with flexible reserve price and discusses how the degree of value affiliation affects the bidding strategies and the degree of competition in takeover auctions. It makes comparative analysis of three different designs of English auctions and shows that a takeover auction is dominated by one of the English auctions with fixed reserve price.
Takeover Laws and Financial Development
Takeover Laws and Financial Development - read free eBook in online reader or directly download on the web page. Select files or add your book in reader. Download and read online ebook Takeover Laws and Financial Development write by Tatiana Nenova. This book was released on 2006. Takeover Laws and Financial Development available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. The issue of "an appropriate" legal framework, especially in the case of the takeover market, has been poorly studied in the case of emerging markets, yet it is of immediate relevance and practical policymaker interest. The study makes a first attempt to analyze takeover regulations in a comparative context across 50 countries. It proposes a methodology to create a detailed index on the most salient features of capital market laws, and illustrates the approach on the case of takeover legislation. The methodology allows better understanding of the impact of laws on markets and development, allows a detailed quantification of a given regulation, in this case takeover market rules, and helps determine relevant policy implications. Specifically, the framework permits the exploration of the effects of individual regulations, their substitutability and interplay, as well as the overall extent of friendliness of the laws to investors, or particular groups thereof (such as minority shareholders), and the links of specialized regulation with the overall legal system. Finally, the study explores the effect of the investor-friendliness of takeover laws on stock market development.
How Has Takeover Competition Changed Over Time?
How Has Takeover Competition Changed Over Time? - read free eBook in online reader or directly download on the web page. Select files or add your book in reader. Download and read online ebook How Has Takeover Competition Changed Over Time? write by Tingting Liu. This book was released on 2018. How Has Takeover Competition Changed Over Time? available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. We study a random sample of completed and withdrawn takeovers during the 1981 to 2014 time period to provide new evidence on the role of takeover impediments such as poison pills, staggered boards and state antitakeover devices. Do such impediments act in the interest of management by promoting entrenchment or do they act in shareholder interest by improving bargaining power during the takeover auction process? We first confirm the growing trend of takeover impediments over time in our sample. We then relate these trends to changes in the takeover auction process over time. Although we corroborate prior findings of a decline in hostile takeovers and publicly reported takeover auctions between the 1980s and later time periods, we find that takeover competition across the entire auction process between deal initiation and completion has not declined. In effect, takeover competition via auctions has gone underground. Moreover, takeover premiums have not declined over time. We interpret the results to be consistent with the shareholder interest/bargaining power hypothesis and inconsistent with the management interest/entrenchment hypothesis. Our analysis highlights the usefulness of research sources for SEC merger documents including microfiche, Lexis Nexis and Thomson One Financial that provide historical information on the takeover auction process prior to the EDGAR filings that started in the mid-1990s.
