Three Essays in Public Mechanism Design - read free eBook in online reader or directly download on the web page. Select files or add your book in reader. Download and read online ebook Three Essays in Public Mechanism Design write by Jin Kim. This book was released on 2003. Three Essays in Public Mechanism Design available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle.
Three Essays on Mechanism Design, Information Design and Collective Decision-making
Three Essays on Mechanism Design, Information Design and Collective Decision-making - read free eBook in online reader or directly download on the web page. Select files or add your book in reader. Download and read online ebook Three Essays on Mechanism Design, Information Design and Collective Decision-making write by Shuguang Zhu. This book was released on 2018. Three Essays on Mechanism Design, Information Design and Collective Decision-making available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. This thesis investigates several topics in Microeconomic Theory, with a focus on incorporating information control into mechanism design, checking the robustness of mechanisms, and providing a foundation for inconsistent collective decision-making. This work helps to optimize information transmission and acquisition in organizational communications, advertisement and policy design. It also sheds light on how inconsistent group decisions derive from heterogeneity in group members, and proposes ways to restore efficiency. The thesis consists of three chapters, each of which is self-contained and can be read separately. The first chapter studies a mechanism design environment where the principal has control over the agents' information about a payoff-relevant state. The principal commits to an information disclosure policy where each agent observes a private signal, while the principal directly observes neither the true state nor the signal profile. Examples include (1) assessing whether a new product matches consumers' preferences through their feedback on sample product trials, and (2) gathering intelligence by authorizing investigators to collect various aspects of information. I establish optimality of individually uninformative and aggregately revealing disclosure policy, where (i) each agent obtains no new information about the state after observing any realization of his own signal, but (ii) the principal can nevertheless infer the true state from the agents' reports about their signals. Furthermore, this optimal disclosure policy admits simple and intuitive implementation (such as certain types of blinded experiments, or restrictions on access to certain information) under additional assumptions. If attention is restricted to linear settings, I characterize a class of environments (including those satisfying the standard regularity conditions in mechanism design) where an equivalence result holds between private disclosure and public disclosure.The second chapter, co-authored with Takuro Yamashita, is motivated by Chung and Ely (2007), who establish maxmin and Bayesian foundations for dominant-strategy mechanisms in private-value auction environments. We first show that similar foundation results for ex post mechanisms hold true even with interdependent values if the interdependence is only cardinal. Conversely, if the environment exhibits ordinal interdependence, which is typically the case with multi-dimensional environments, then in general, ex post mechanisms do not have foundation. That is, there exists a non-ex-post mechanism that achieves strictly higher expected revenue than the optimal ex post mechanism, regardless of the agents' high-order beliefs. The third chapter shows that dynamic inconsistency in collective decision-making can derive from heterogeneity in group members' outside options (i.e. opportunity costs that individuals have to pay in order to join the group), even if individuals share the same exponentially discounting time preference. This model of endogenous dynamic inconsistency facilitatesthe analysis of welfare consequences, since time-consistent individual preferences allow for a well-defined measurement of social welfare. We further characterize the optimal Bayesian persuasion information disclosure policy, which takes the form of upper revealing rules, to alleviate the welfare distortion caused by inconsistent collective decisions. Our framework proves to be highly adaptable to various contexts, including provision of public facilities and assignment on team work.
Three Essays on Mechanism Design
Three Essays on Mechanism Design - read free eBook in online reader or directly download on the web page. Select files or add your book in reader. Download and read online ebook Three Essays on Mechanism Design write by Anca Mihut. This book was released on 2017. Three Essays on Mechanism Design available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. The three essays presented in this thesis, concentrate on different areas of mechanism design that aim to address environmental issues related to permits markets, electricity consumption and water use. Using the advantages of a laboratory setting, this thesis aims to contribute to the ongoing debate regarding the appropriate mechanisms solutions for solving severalenvironmental issues related to the design of emission markets, the management of common pool resources and the impact of designing complex tariff mechanisms for acquiring a good. In the first essay, we use experimental emissions trading markets to investigate the effects of two types of instruments for dealing with the negative effects of price risk that results from the potential shocks that could affect production costs. As per the results obtained, the first mechanism that allows banking and borrowing permits from one period to another, yields some important benefits in terms of the reduction of price volatility and leading to overall flatter price series. The second instrument, besides allowing for permit transfer, also considers an adjustable supply of permits, such that besides managing to stabilize the price path, it also creates more significant results in terms of settling it around a desired target price level.In the second essay, we consider the dilemma that consumers are often faced with, when dealing with different tariff choices (mobile phone, electricity, train, airplane, gas etc.). It may be very complex to choose among these tariffs, notably because of the so-called cognitive biases that might distort consumers' perception. Typically, what should consumers choose between a simple tariff pricing and a more complex but also more advantageous non-linear tariff structure? We show that, in the lab, even when the more complex non-linear tariff structures are 50% more advantageous, in terms of gain expectancy, consumers constantly stick to the tariff with the most simple structure. Subjects are reluctant to choose pricing instruments containing a fixed cost and increasing block pricing structures.In the third essay, we examine cooperation in the context of a non-linear common pool resource game, in which individuals have unequal extraction capacities. We introduce two types of policy instruments in this environment. One instrument is based on two variants of a mechanism that taxes extraction and redistributes the tax revenue to group members. The other instrument varies the social observability of individual decisions. We find that both tax mechanisms reduce extraction, increase efficiency and reduce inequality within groups. In contrast, observability impacts only the Baseline condition by facilitating free-riding instead of creating a moral pressure on group members.
Essays in Mechanism Design
Essays in Mechanism Design - read free eBook in online reader or directly download on the web page. Select files or add your book in reader. Download and read online ebook Essays in Mechanism Design write by Guilherme Pereira de Freitas. This book was released on 2013. Essays in Mechanism Design available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. This dissertation contains three essays on mechanism design. The common goal of these essays is to assist in the solution of different resource allocation problems where asymmetric information creates obstacles to the efficient allocation of resources. In each essay, we present a mechanism that satisfactorily solves the resource allocation problem and study some of its properties. In our first essay, "Combinatorial Assignment under Dichotomous Preferences", we present a class of problems akin to time scheduling without a pre-existing time grid, and propose a mechanism that is efficient, strategy-proof and envy-free. Our second essay, "Monitoring Costs and the Management of Common-Pool Resources", studies what can happen to an existing mechanism - the individual tradable quotas (ITQ) mechanism, also known as the cap-and-trade mechanism - when quota enforcement is imperfect and costly. Our third essay, "Vessel Buyback", coauthored with John O. Ledyard, presents an auction design that can be used to buy back excess capital in overcapitalized industries.
Essays in Mechanism Design
Essays in Mechanism Design - read free eBook in online reader or directly download on the web page. Select files or add your book in reader. Download and read online ebook Essays in Mechanism Design write by Weixin Chen (Researcher in microeconomic theory). This book was released on 2020. Essays in Mechanism Design available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. This thesis consists of three papers in mechanism design. Chapter 1 is based on a paper of mine entitled "Quality Disclosure and Price Discrimination". Chapter 2 is based on "Penalty, Voting, and Collusion: a Common Agency Approach to Industrial Regulation and Political Power". Chapter 3 is based on "Partitional Information Revelation under Renegotiation". A key framework in mechanism design is screening: a principal who designs the contract induces agents with private information to select certain action(s) or bundle(s). Classical results are second-best distortion and Myerson ironing, which are derived when the agency involves a single task (or tasks independent across agents), an agent's information is privately known by himself, and there is full commitment. Chapter 1 considers incentivizing tasks that are related through a resource constraint. It studies the second-degree price discrimination when the supply quality follows some exogenous distribution, or more specifically, the design of information and pricing in a monopolistic market with product quality dispersion. The main message is that optimality requires a partial disclosure, and finer results on the allocation distortion depend on the heterogeneity of the buyers' preference. When such preference over assignment, i.e., quality distribution, has a uni-dimensional sufficient statistics in the quality space, the optimal distortion resembles Myerson's ironing and the optimal disclosure takes a partitional form. For more general preference, the optimal distortion departs from Myerson's result. Chapter 2 considers eliciting signals informative of the agent's private information from multiple sources. An interesting case is by considering a voting committee as the principal, where voting aggregates welfare-relevant information but faces corruptive incentives. The key insights are that the optimal rule is a binary verdict, resembling the principle of maximum deterrence, and the corruptive incentives typically push the optimal voting rule towards unanimity. Chapter 3 considers commitment with renegotiation: the counterparties can stick to the previously signed long-term contract or revise it with mutual consent. More specifically, it studies a long-term relationship between a seller and a buyer whose valuation (for a per-period service or a rental good) is private. In such a dynamic game, a new dimension of mechanism design, namely intertemporal type separation, arises as its induced belief-updating affects the rent extraction--efficiency tradeoff. The main message is that all PBE share the following property in the progressive screening process: at each history, the seller partitions the posterior support into countable intervals and offers a pooling contract to each of these intervals.
