Three Essays on Mechanism Design, Information Design and Collective Decision-making - read free eBook in online reader or directly download on the web page. Select files or add your book in reader. Download and read online ebook Three Essays on Mechanism Design, Information Design and Collective Decision-making write by Shuguang Zhu. This book was released on 2018. Three Essays on Mechanism Design, Information Design and Collective Decision-making available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. This thesis investigates several topics in Microeconomic Theory, with a focus on incorporating information control into mechanism design, checking the robustness of mechanisms, and providing a foundation for inconsistent collective decision-making. This work helps to optimize information transmission and acquisition in organizational communications, advertisement and policy design. It also sheds light on how inconsistent group decisions derive from heterogeneity in group members, and proposes ways to restore efficiency. The thesis consists of three chapters, each of which is self-contained and can be read separately. The first chapter studies a mechanism design environment where the principal has control over the agents' information about a payoff-relevant state. The principal commits to an information disclosure policy where each agent observes a private signal, while the principal directly observes neither the true state nor the signal profile. Examples include (1) assessing whether a new product matches consumers' preferences through their feedback on sample product trials, and (2) gathering intelligence by authorizing investigators to collect various aspects of information. I establish optimality of individually uninformative and aggregately revealing disclosure policy, where (i) each agent obtains no new information about the state after observing any realization of his own signal, but (ii) the principal can nevertheless infer the true state from the agents' reports about their signals. Furthermore, this optimal disclosure policy admits simple and intuitive implementation (such as certain types of blinded experiments, or restrictions on access to certain information) under additional assumptions. If attention is restricted to linear settings, I characterize a class of environments (including those satisfying the standard regularity conditions in mechanism design) where an equivalence result holds between private disclosure and public disclosure.The second chapter, co-authored with Takuro Yamashita, is motivated by Chung and Ely (2007), who establish maxmin and Bayesian foundations for dominant-strategy mechanisms in private-value auction environments. We first show that similar foundation results for ex post mechanisms hold true even with interdependent values if the interdependence is only cardinal. Conversely, if the environment exhibits ordinal interdependence, which is typically the case with multi-dimensional environments, then in general, ex post mechanisms do not have foundation. That is, there exists a non-ex-post mechanism that achieves strictly higher expected revenue than the optimal ex post mechanism, regardless of the agents' high-order beliefs. The third chapter shows that dynamic inconsistency in collective decision-making can derive from heterogeneity in group members' outside options (i.e. opportunity costs that individuals have to pay in order to join the group), even if individuals share the same exponentially discounting time preference. This model of endogenous dynamic inconsistency facilitatesthe analysis of welfare consequences, since time-consistent individual preferences allow for a well-defined measurement of social welfare. We further characterize the optimal Bayesian persuasion information disclosure policy, which takes the form of upper revealing rules, to alleviate the welfare distortion caused by inconsistent collective decisions. Our framework proves to be highly adaptable to various contexts, including provision of public facilities and assignment on team work.
Essays in Mechanism Design
Essays in Mechanism Design - read free eBook in online reader or directly download on the web page. Select files or add your book in reader. Download and read online ebook Essays in Mechanism Design write by . This book was released on 2007. Essays in Mechanism Design available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. This thesis consists of three self-contained essays on mechanism design problems: a collective decision problem, a theoretical auction problem, and an applied auction problem. Chapter 1 contains an introduction. In Chapter 2 I consider a problem where a group has to take a collective decision. I study how the decision mechanism should be designed when the information relevant for the decision is dispersed among the group members and when the group members' preferences over decisions might be in conflict. Observed mechanisms differ in whether the most extreme positions are disregarded or not. I find that the designer should never disregard the most extreme positions, but that he should limit the amount by which single group members can affect the decision. In Chapter 3 I analyze a seller's problem to design an optimal first-price auction. Normally the design problem reduces to the problem of determining the lowest admissible bid. I show that the structure of the optimal first-price auction may be non-standard when the seller cannot commit to sell to the highest bidder after observing the bids, and when he is able to fix the auction rules already at a time at which he is still uncertain about his own use value. In this case the seller might allow high and low bids, but forbid intermediate ones. In the last chapter I am interested in the problem of a procurer to organize his procurement process. I compare two procurement systems resembling stylized facts from American and Japanese procurement. In the first system the procurer exerts as much competitive pressure on his incumbent supplier as possible, while in the second system he protects his incumbent supplier by looking only for possible replacements after bilateral negotiations with him break down. I show that either system may induce higher relationship-specific investments and I describe under which conditions which of the two systems is preferable from the procurer's point of view.
Three Essays in Information and Mechanism Design
Three Essays in Information and Mechanism Design - read free eBook in online reader or directly download on the web page. Select files or add your book in reader. Download and read online ebook Three Essays in Information and Mechanism Design write by Victor Augias. This book was released on 2023. Three Essays in Information and Mechanism Design available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. This thesis comprises three independent essays, exploring various theoretical issues related to the design of information structures and incentive mechanisms. The first chapter investigates how to optimally design selection mechanisms, taking into account that candidates can strategically invest in the attributes upon which they are evaluated. We demonstrate that when the goal is to maximize the expected quality of admitted candidates, deterministic "pass or fail" selection rules prove to be optimal. The second chapter examines a non-Bayesian persuasion model where the receiver's belief formation process is motivated. We show that persuasion is more effective compared to the Bayesian case when it encourages the receiver to adopt a risky behavior that can lead to significant gains, but it is less effective when promoting more cautious behavior. We illustrate this finding with applications. The third and final chapter studies the distributive impacts of market segmentation. We examine how to segment a monopolistic market with a redistributive objective, i.e., favoring the poorest consumers. We show that optimal redistributive segmentations always generate Pareto-efficient allocations, but may require granting a strictly positive share of the surplus to the seller.
Essays on Information and Mechanism Design
Essays on Information and Mechanism Design - read free eBook in online reader or directly download on the web page. Select files or add your book in reader. Download and read online ebook Essays on Information and Mechanism Design write by Ina Angelova Taneva. This book was released on 2014. Essays on Information and Mechanism Design available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. My dissertation studies the optimal design of institutions and information structures for different objectives of a designer or a social planner. The questions addressed are interesting both from a theoretical point of view, and in terms of their real-life applications. The first chapter of the dissertation focuses on supermodular mechanism design in environments with arbitrary finite type spaces and interdependent valuations. In these environments, the designer may have to use Bayesian equilibrium as a solution concept, because ex post implementation may not be possible. We propose direct Bayesian mechanisms that are robust to certain forms of bounded rationality while controlling for equilibrium multiplicity. In quasi-linear environments with informational and allocative externalities, we show that any Bayesian mechanism that implements a social choice function can be converted into a supermodular mechanism that also implements the original decision rule. The proposed supermodular mechanism can be chosen in a way that minimizes the size of the equilibrium set, and we provide two sets of sufficient conditions to this effect: for general decision rules and for decision rules that satisfy a certain requirement. This is followed by conditions for supermodular implementation in unique equilibrium. The second chapter looks at the incentives of a revenue-maximizing seller (designer) who discloses information to a number of interacting bidders (agents). In particular, the designer chooses the level of precision with which agents can infer the quality of a common-value object from their privately observed signals. We restrict attention to the second-price sealed-bid auction format. If the seller has perfect commitment power and can choose the precision level before observing the quality of the object, in the presence of any small cost to precision it is ex ante optimal for her to choose completely uninformative signals. For the case when the seller chooses the precision level after observing the quality of the object, we characterize pooling, partial pooling, and separating equilibria. We show that in this setting the cost associated with precision can be viewed as a form of commitment device: if costs are too low, the best pooling equilibrium ceases to exist as the high type seller is too tempted to separate. Thus, the seller ends up with a lower ex ante expected payoff than in the case when cost parameters are above a certain threshold. The third chapter of this dissertation studies the optimal choice of information structure from the perspective of a designer maximizing a certain objective function. Generally speaking, there are two ways of creating incentives for interacting agents to behave in a desired way. One is by providing appropriate payoff incentives, which is the subject of mechanism design. The other is by choosing the information that agents observe, which we refer to as information design. We consider a model of symmetric information where a designer chooses and announces the information structure about a payoff relevant state. The interacting agents observe the signal realizations, update their beliefs, and take actions which affect the welfare of both the designer and the agents. We characterize the general finite approach to deriving the optimal information structure --- the one that maximizes the designer's ex ante expected utility subject to agents playing a Bayes Nash equilibrium. We then apply the general approach to a symmetric two state, two agent, and two actions environment in a parameterized underlying game and fully characterize the optimal information structure. It is never strictly optimal for the designer to use conditionally independent private signals. The optimal information structure may be a public signal, or may consist of correlated private signals. Finally, we examine how changes in the underlying game affect the designer's maximum payoff. This exercise provides a joint mechanism/information design perspective.
Three Essays in Public Mechanism Design
Three Essays in Public Mechanism Design - read free eBook in online reader or directly download on the web page. Select files or add your book in reader. Download and read online ebook Three Essays in Public Mechanism Design write by Jin Kim. This book was released on 2003. Three Essays in Public Mechanism Design available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle.
