Three Essays on Strategic Aspects in Oligopoly with Vertical Structure

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Release : 2012
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Three Essays on Strategic Aspects in Oligopoly with Vertical Structure - read free eBook in online reader or directly download on the web page. Select files or add your book in reader. Download and read online ebook Three Essays on Strategic Aspects in Oligopoly with Vertical Structure write by Mohammad Ali Kashefi. This book was released on 2012. Three Essays on Strategic Aspects in Oligopoly with Vertical Structure available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle.

Strategic Aspects of Oligopolistic Vertical Integration

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Release : 2017-12-28
Genre : Business & Economics
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Book Rating : 164/5 ( reviews)

Strategic Aspects of Oligopolistic Vertical Integration - read free eBook in online reader or directly download on the web page. Select files or add your book in reader. Download and read online ebook Strategic Aspects of Oligopolistic Vertical Integration write by C. Wu. This book was released on 2017-12-28. Strategic Aspects of Oligopolistic Vertical Integration available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. In this text some fundamental issues concerning the strategic impact of vertical structures of firms are discussed in a successive oligopoly model. Vertical integration strategy has been identified as one of the key strategies which determine the success or failure of enterprises. Many studies on vertical integration are based on business experiences and interviews with managers. However, the extensive application of game theory in business economics allows this study on vertical integration to be based on sound theoretic ground. Moreover, the significance of public enterprises in some Western European economies and the trends of economic transition in Eastern Europe justify the efforts to analyse vertical integration issues in the mixed market, which is created by the participation of a public firm into an industry otherwise characterised as a successive oligopoly.

Three Essays on Successive Vertical Oligopolies

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Release : 2005
Genre : Oligopolies
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Three Essays on Successive Vertical Oligopolies - read free eBook in online reader or directly download on the web page. Select files or add your book in reader. Download and read online ebook Three Essays on Successive Vertical Oligopolies write by Joon Lim. This book was released on 2005. Three Essays on Successive Vertical Oligopolies available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle.

Three Essays on Oligopoly and Financial Structure

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Release : 2002
Genre : Equilibrium (Economics)
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Three Essays on Oligopoly and Financial Structure - read free eBook in online reader or directly download on the web page. Select files or add your book in reader. Download and read online ebook Three Essays on Oligopoly and Financial Structure write by Hyun Jong Kim. This book was released on 2002. Three Essays on Oligopoly and Financial Structure available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle.

Essays on Strategic Behavior in Oligopoly Markets

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Release : 2009
Genre : Oligopolies
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Essays on Strategic Behavior in Oligopoly Markets - read free eBook in online reader or directly download on the web page. Select files or add your book in reader. Download and read online ebook Essays on Strategic Behavior in Oligopoly Markets write by Kosin Isariyawongse. This book was released on 2009. Essays on Strategic Behavior in Oligopoly Markets available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. This dissertation addresses issues of strategic behavior of firms in oligopoly markets. In the first study we analyze how generic advertising affects brand advertising and firm profits in differentiated oligopoly markets. We develop two models, one with vertical differentiation and another with horizontal differentiation. In the case of vertical differentiation, we amend Crespi's (2007) model to show that only the high quality firm will use brand advertising. We also show that when differentiation is horizontal, the equilibrium is likely to be more symmetric in terms of each firm's profits, spending on brand advertising, and response to generic advertising. We also demonstrate that generic advertising will increase expenditures on brand advertising when firms play a supermodular game. In the second study, we analyze the interaction between generic advertising, brand advertising, and firm profits when products are differentiated either vertically or horizontally and brand advertising is purely informative. That is, brand advertising lowers consumer search costs of identifying brand characteristics. The model demonstrates that firms can benefit from investing in brand advertising that lowers consumer search costs as well as from brand advertising that is purely persuasive. In addition, the results demonstrate that whether brand advertising is persuasive or informative, the outcome is more likely to be symmetric with horizontal differentiation than with vertical differentiation. This study shows that brand advertising is a strategic complement when persuasive and a strategic substitute when informative. In the third study, we allow the choice of strategic variable, output and price, to be endogenous to the firm. We consider the case where one firm chooses output and the other firm chooses price, which we call a Cournot-Bertrand model. We provide a real world example of this "Cournot-Bertrand" behavior and show that the outcome can be a Nash equilibrium. Allowing the timing of play (early or late) as well as the strategic variable (output or price) to be endogenous, we demonstrate an outcome where one firm competes in output and the other firm competes in price can be a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.